

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1366

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0632

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES ON DECEMBER 17, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING A SOVIET INVITATION GOING BACK SOME 10 DAYS, US REP, DEPREP AND JCS REP HAD DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY AND SOVIET MILREP KAPITONOV ON DECEMBER 17. DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL. KHLESTOV SAID THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS FIRMLY LINKED TO THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. THE EAST HAD NOT CHANGED ITS NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE WESTERN OUTLINE. NONETHELESS, HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO MOSCOW THAT HE STATE IN HIS PLENARY PRESENTATION OF DECEMBER 18 THAT WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD STUDY THE PROPOSAL AND HOPED MOSCOW WOULD CONFIRM THIS SUGGESTION IN RETURN INSTRUCTIONS.

2. KHLESTOV STARTED HIS REVIEW OF THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS BY STRESSING CLAIM THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS AND
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ESPECIALLY THE FRG WERE TRYING TO EVADE SPECIFIC REDUCTION

OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID REDUCTION OF FORCES OF THESE PARTICIPANTS, ESPECIALLY OF THE FRG, WAS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR. HE ALSO SAID DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN THE NEXT ROUND. AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE IN MOVING THINGS AHEAD.

3. REGARDING THE WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL, KHLESTOV ASKED THE QUESTIONS LISTED BELOW, EXPLAINING THAT THEY WERE ASKED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL INTEREST IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL: (A) WOULD THERE BE LIMITS ON U.S. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OTHER THAN THOSE REDUCED? (B) WOULD THE WITHDRAWN WARHEADS INCLUDE THOSE ALLOCATED TO THE WITHDRAWN PERSHING'S?; (C) WOULD PERSHING AND F-4'S BE WITHDRAWN AS UNITS?; (C) WHAT WAS THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE WESTERN DECISION TO OFFER TO WITHDRAW PRECISELY 1,000 WARHEADS, 36 PERSHING'S AND 54 F-4'S?; (E) WHAT WOULD BE DONE AS REGARDS REPLACEMENT MODELS FOR PERSHING AND F-4'S?; (F) COULD GERMAN PERSHING'S INCREASE WITHOUT LIMIT?; (G) HOW WOULD VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL OF REDUCED PERSHING'S, F-4'S AND WARHEADS BE CARRIED OUT?; (H) WOULD THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING PERMIT INCREASE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER; IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER WERE WITHOUT A SPECIFIC CEILING AND AIRCRAFT WERE ALSO UNLIMITED, WHAT WOULD PREVENT UNLIMITED INCREASE OF AIR FORCES IN THE AREA? KHLESTOV ASKED NO REPEAT NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET ARMAMENTS.

4. BECAUSE KHLESTOV'S COMMENTS PROVIDE THE FIRST SPECIFIC INDICATION OF DIRECTION OF SOVIET THINKING ON OPTION 3, WE ARE SENDING FULL REPORT TELEGRAPHICALLY. END SUMMARY.

5. KHLESTOV COMMENTED IT WAS USUAL PRACTICE AT THE END OF A ROUND FOR U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS TO GET TOGETHER AND REVIEW THE PAST ROUND. HE WISHED TO DO THE SAME THING ON THIS OCCASION. THERE REMAINED SEVERAL OPEN ISSUES OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE. ONE SUCH ISSUE WAS THAT OF PARTICIPATION FROM THE OUTSET OF REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ESPECIALLY THE FRG, IN REDUCTIONS. THERE HAD BEEN CONTINUING DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC BUT THE EAST WAS STILL NOT SATISFIED WITH THE POSITION OF

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THE WESTERN EUROPEANS, WHO HAD BLUNTLY TOLD EAST THEY WOULD NOT ASSUME ANY OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE EITHER IN THE FIRST OR THE SECOND PHASE. WHEN US REP PROTESTED, KHLESTOV SAID THIS MIGHT BE AN OVERSIMPLIFICATION OF WHAT HAD BEEN SAID. HE CONTINUED THAT, OFFICIALLY, THE WEST HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT THE QUESTION OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS WOULD BE DECIDED IN THE SECOND PHASE. BUT A NUMBER OF DISCUSSIONS SOME OF WHICH HAD TAKEFSEN PLACE DURING THE INFORMAL SESSIONS AND SOME

BILATERALLY HAD LED THE SOVIETS TO BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST AT THIS TIME, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, REFLECTING THE VIEWS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, WERE TRYING TO EVADE ASSUMING SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS OBLIGATIONS.

6. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE EAST CONTINUED TO WANT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. LACK OF PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE WAS A BAD THING BECAUSE IT GAVE REALISTIC GROUNDS TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WHATEVER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, A CONCLUSION WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY NEGATIVE EFFECTS. HE WISHED TO STATE VERY FRANKLY THAT REDUCTIONS OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WEST AND EAST, AND SPECIFICALLY OF THE FRG, WAS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR.

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7. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE WORK DURING THE PAST ROUND ON THE ELABORATION OF AN AGREED DEFINITION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO GROUND AND AIR HAD BEEN A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

THE WORK DONE HAD BEEN HELPFUL. IT HAD ENABLED PARTICIPANTS TO SEE WHAT WAS WHAT AS FAR AS REDUCTIONS WERE CONCERNED, AND WHAT ALLOCATION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY USEFUL TO HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS MEANT BY GROUND AND AIR FORCES. SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THIS TOPIC. THE DISCUSSIONS THE TWO DELEGATIONS HAD HAD ON THIS TOPIC HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY USEFUL.

8. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE US DELEGATION FOR FAILURE TO BRING THIS WORK TO A CONCLUSION. THE SOVIET REPS HAD MADE AN AUDACIOUS EFFORT AND HAD PUT A DRAFT COMPROMISE FORWARD. THE US DELEGATION HAD ALSO TRIED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EASTERN VIEWS. HE BELIEVED THERE SHOULD BE A SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION IN THE NEXT ROUND. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON A DEFINITION IF THEY ACTED ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS. HE URGED THAT US REP CONSIDER CARE-
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FULLY THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE. IF PARTICIPANTS SUCCEEDED IN AGREEING ON A DEFINITION DURING THE NEXT ROUND, AND THIS WOULD BE BEST DONE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND, THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE IN MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND ALSO FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTLING OTHER PROBLEMS.

9. KHLESTOV SAID, AS REGARDS ANOTHER TOPIC TREATED IN THE PAST ROUND, HE WOULD NOT NOW TAKE THE TIME TO CRITICIZE THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES. US REPS ALREADY KNEW THE SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS TOPIC. AS REGARDS REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES, IT HAD BEEN THE EASTERN POSITION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCES SHOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS. IN ORDER TO HAVE AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION, ALL TYPES OF FORCES MUST BE COVERED.

10. KHLESTOV COMMENTED THAT THE EXCELLENT WORKING ATMOSPHERE HAD CONTINUED FURING THE ROUND. THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FEW OCCASIONS WHERE HE HAD USED TOUGHER LANGUAGE. BUT EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAD NOT ORIGINATED THIS. THEY HAD BEEN RESPONDING. HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP ELEMENTS OF THIS TYPE OUT OF THE DISCUSSION SO AS NOT TO SPOIL THE BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE AND IMPEDE THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. CONTACTS WITH THE US REPS HAD ALSO CONTINUED USEFUL.

KHLESTOV SAID THE EASTERN POLICY LINE WAS TO BRING THE VIENNA NEGOTITATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. BUT WAYS HAD TO BE FOUND TO PUT THIS GUIDANCE INTO PRACTICE. THERE WERE STILL IMPORTANT UNRESOLVED DIFFICULTIES AND THE TASK OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WAS TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

12. US REP SAID HE AGREED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS HAD BEEN GOOD AS WERE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS. US REPS BELIEVED DEEPLY IN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS AND OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING A USEFUL OUTCOME.

13. US REP SAID KHLESTOV'S FIRST POINT HAD DEALT WITH HIS INTEREST IN REDUCTION BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. PERHAPS INADVERTENTLY, KHLESTOV HAD UNDERESTIMATED THE UNDER-
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TAKINGS THESE PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY MADE. THEY HAD ALL WITHOUT EXCEPTION AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE TO A COMMON CEILING. IT WAS TRUE THAT THEY HAD SAID THAT THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THOSE OBLIGATIONS WAS A MATTER MORE APPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION IN THE SECOND PHASE ITSELF. MOREOVER, THESE PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING FROM THE OUTSET TO UNDERTAKE NO-INCREASE OBLIGATIONS ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THESE PARTICIPANTS WOULD CLEARLY PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. CONCERNS THAT REDUCTIONS OF ANY PARTICULAR COUNTRIES WOULD BE SMALL OR NEGLIGIBLE WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN THE REAL WORLD IN THE PRACTICAL SENSE.

14. US REP SAID, AS TO THE DEFINITIONS ISSUE, HE AGREED THAT DISCUSSION DURING THE PAST ROUND HAD BEEN USEFUL. PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT GOTTEN AS FAR AS IT WAS DESIRABLE ON THIS TECHNICAL BUT IMPORTANT MATTER. THE US AND THE SOVIET REPS UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER'S VIEWS BETTER AND THEIR DISCUSSIONS OF THE QUESTION HAD GIVEN BOTH SIDES SOME IDEAS ON HOW THEY MIGHT PROCEED IN THE NEXT ROUND. HE AGREED WITH KHLESTOV THAT, THE SOONER A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WAS FOUND FOR THIS MATTER, THE BETTER, BECAUSE HE TOO BELIEVED AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION WOULD BE A USEFUL MOVE.

15. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD JUST MENTIONED A FEW QUESTIONS RELATED TO REDUCTION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ARMAMENTS. ON THIS ISSUE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FIND OUT CLEARLY THE POSITION OF EACH SIDE. SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO HOLD AN INFORMAL SESSION ON THIS TOPIC, HE WOULD AS A SUBSTITUTE LIKE TO ASK A FEW QUESTIONS NOW ABOUT THE RECENT WESTERN PROPOSAL. HE WISHED TO REPEAT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OR WESTERN VIEWS HAD BEEN PRESENTED IN SUCH A WAY THAT ONE COULD NOT PREVENT ONESELF FROM ASKING A FEW QUESTIONS. SINCE WESTERN REPS HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A VERY SERIOUS PROPOSAL, HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HOW SERIOUS IT REALLY WAS AND ASK A FEW QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS US REP'S PRESENTATION IN THE LAST PLENARY SESSION. THESE QUESTIONS, OF COURSE, SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS INDICATING OFFICIAL INTEREST, BUT MERELY AS A WAY OF BETTER UNDERSTAND-

ING HOW US REPS THMSSELVES SAW THE WESTERN PROPOSAL.

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EXDIS

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FROM US REP MBFR

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16. KHLESTOV SAID THE FIRST QUESTION WAS, WESTERN REPS
HAD SAID THAT THE US WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA PERSHING
BALLISTIC LAUNCHERS AND F-4 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT.
IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE US ARMED FORCES LOCATED IN THE
REDUCTION AREA HAD OTHER MEANS OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY. US
REP HAD IN HIS PLENARY PRESENTATION IMPLIED THAT THE ELEMENTS
TO BE REDUCED WOULD NOT BE INCREASED. THIS WOULD BE
WITH REGARD TO THE PERSHING LAUNCHERS AND THE F-4
AIRCRAFT AND WOULD MEAN THAT THEIR TOTAL NUMBER WOULD NOT
BE INCREASED AFTER WITHDRAWALS. WAS IT CORRECT FOR THE

SOVIETS TO UNDERSTAND THAT, EXCEPT FOR THE PERSHING BALLISTIC LAUNCHERS AND THE F-4 AIRCRAFT, THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE THE OTHER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IT HAD IN THE AREA AND WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DO SO. WAS THIS INTERPRETATION CORRECT? US REP SAID THE WESTERN OFFER WAS TO WITHDRAW THOSE NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE AREA WITH THE GREATEST RANGE AND STRIKE CAPABILITY. THE US HAD NOT INCLUDED OTHER US NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN ITS PROPOSAL.

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17. US REP SAID THAT, AS WESTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED, AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE CERTAIN ELEMENTS INCLUDED IMPLICITLY A CEILING ON THOSE REDUCED ELEMENTS AT THIS LEVEL. BUT, THE WHOLE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS WAS COMPLICATED AND WESTERN REPS WERE NOT WILLING TO GO INTO IT IN DETAIL UNTIL AFTER THEY HAD RECEIVED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER POSITIVELY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL.

18. KHESTOV TRIED AGAIN. HE SAID, JUDGING FROM THE TEXT OF THE US REP'S PLENARY PRESENTATION, THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING NOT TO INCREASE THOSE ELEMENTS WITHDRAWN. US REP SAID THIS WAS CORRECT. IT MEANT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO LIMIT THE F-4'S, WARHEADS, AND PERSHING. THIS WAS ALL HE COULD SAY.

19. KHESTOV SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A FURTHER QUESTION, AGAIN FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING. US REP HAD SAID THAT THE US WAS READY TO WITHDRAW 1,000 US WARHEADS FROM THE AREA. WOULD THESE WITHDRAWALS INCLUDE THE WARHEADS FOR THE WITHDRAWN PERSHING AND F-4'S OR OTHER WARHEADS DESIGNED FOR OTHER LAUNCHERS? US REP SAID THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DID INCLUDE THE OFFER TO WITHDRAW 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HE COULD NOT SAY ANYTHING FURTHER ON THIS POINT.

20. KHESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE US PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS BATTALIONS, BATTERIES OR AS INDIVIDUAL LAUNCHERS. US REP SAID THE US HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW IT WISHED TO CARRY OUT THESE REDUCTIONS.

21. KHESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE 54 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN UNITS OR INDIVIDUALLY. US REP SAID THAT THE US HAD NOT YET DECIDED THIS.

22. KHESTOV ASKED US REP IF LATTER COULD DESCRIBE THE PRINCIPLE THAT UNDERLAY THE US DECISION AS TO THE SPECIFIC NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND LAUNCHERS THE US HAD

EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE. WHY WAS IT 1,000 US WAR-
HEADS, 36 PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND 54 F-4
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AIRCRAFT, RATHER THAN SOME OTHER NUMBER? WHAT HAD BEEN
THE REASON FOR DECIDING ON THESE NUMBERS? US REP SAID THE
PROPOSED NUCLEAR WITHDRAWAL WAS A VERY SIGNIFICANT
COMPLEMENT TO THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PROPOSAL. WHEN THIS
NUCLEAR WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL WAS ADDED TO THE REDUCTIONS
THE WEST HAD PREVIOUSLY OFFERED, IT WAS INDISPUTABLE THAT
THE TOTAL PACKAGE THE WEST WAS NOW OFFERING WAS AT LEAST
EQUAL TO WHAT THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR FROM THE EAST.

23. KHESTOV ASKED WHETHER US REP MEANT WITH THIS LANGUAGE
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY. US REP SAID PERHAPS
HE SHOULD EXPLAIN SOMEWHAT MORE FULLY. THE MANPOWER THE
WEST HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED TO WITHDRAW PLUS THE PROPOSED
NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, PLUS THE FACT THAT THE US WAS WILLING
TO UNDERTAKE THE LIMITATIONS HE HAD DESCRIBED WAS IN THE
WESTERN VIEW AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE WITHDRAWALS THE WEST
WAS ASKING OF THE SOVIETS, NOT ONLY THE TANK ARMY BUT ALSO
THE COMMON CEILING.

24. KHESTOV PERSISTED IN HIS EFFORT. HE SAID THAT ACCORDING
TO THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, IN THE FIRST PHASE,
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS.
THIS MEANT THE SOVIETS WOULD REDUCE 39,000 MORE MEN AND
1,700 MORE TANKS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND IN THE SECOND PHASE,
150,000 MORE MEN THAN IN THE WEST, MEANING THAT THE EAST
WOULD REDUCE 189,000 MORE MEN AND 1,700 TANKS IN RETURN
FOR 54-F-4'S, 36 PERSHING LAUNCHERS AND 1,000 WARHEADS.
US REP OBSERVED THAT KHESTOV HAD OMITTED ABOUT 50,000
PHASE III WESTERN REDUCTIONS FROM HIS CALCULATIONS.
MOREOVER, AS HE HAD EXPLAINED, EACH SIDE WOULD ENTER INTO
LIMITATIONS ON THEIR RESIDUAL FORCES. IT WAS THE WESTERN
VIEW THAT THE TOTAL PACKAGE OF OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO
BY THE WESTERN SIDE WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT WAS ASKED
FOR FROM THE EAST.

24. KHESTOV SAID THIS WAS A POLITICAL EQUATION. BUT
FROM THE PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT, HIS CALCULATION WAS
THAT IN EXCHANGE FOR 180,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS, THE US WAS
WILLING TO REDUCE 54 F-4'S, 36 PERSHING LAUNCHERS AND
1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. US REP PROTESTED AT KHESTOV'S
DEFECTIVE ARITHMETIC. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD CORRECT THE
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180,000 FIGURE TO 150,000. BUT WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN FIGURES OF 54 AIRCRAFT, 36 PERSHING, AND 1,000 WARHEADS? US REP SAID KHLESTOV HAD LEFT OUT THE EFFECTS OF LIMITATIONS WHICH WERE HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT IN MILITARY TERMS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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25. KHLESTOV SAID THE LAST POINT WAS CLEAR ENOUGH
ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FOLLOW THE REST OF THE
EXPLANATION. HE HAD A FURTHER QUESTION. US REP HAD SAID
THE WITHDRAWAL OF PESHINGS AND NUCLEAR-
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WERE A ONE-TIME OFFER. AFTER WITHDRAWAL,
IT WAS IMPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE A CEILING ON
F-4 AIRCRAFT AND PERSHING LAUNCHERS. WOULD THIS ALLOW FOR
THE INTRODUCTION INTO THE AREA OF NEW NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
SUCH AS THE "JUPITER" (SIC) AND THE "F-16?" US REP SAID
THIS WAS A FAIR AND IMPORTANT QUESTION. HE BELIEVED THAT
ONE COULD DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE AT A LATER TIME IN THE

DISCUSSIONS. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A DEFINITION OF "NUCLEAR-CAPABLE." BUT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE ONLY AFTER THEY GOT INTO THE DETAILS OF LIMITATIONS FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL.

26. KHESTOV SAID THAT, IN US REP'S PLENARY STATEMENT, THE LATTER HAD EXPRESSED THE WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW US PERSHING, SECRET

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F-4'S AND WARHEADS WITH THE US FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BUT PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS WERE ALSO ASSIGNED TO THE FEDERAL GERMAN FORCES IN THE AREA. WAS IT CORRECT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT THE NUMBER OF FRG PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS IN THE AREA TO BE INCREASED? US REP REPLIED THAT AS KHESTOV KNEW, REDUCTION OF NON-US WESTERN EQUIPMENT WAS NOT PART OF THE WESTERN OFFER. THE SOVIETS ALSO KNEW THAT THE MAIN WESTERN INTEREST CONTINUED TO BE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES. THE WEST WAS WILLING TO MAKE A ONE-TIME ADDITION OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS TO ITS WITHDRAWALS TO GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE WEST. BUT THIS WAS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND THE WEST WAS NOT WILLING TO MAKE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN MEN OR ARMAMENTS. THIS WAS BECAUSE WHAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT IT WAS ASKING FOR.

27. KHESTOV ASKED WHAT WAS THE WESTERN CONCEPT FOR CONTROL OR CHECKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND LAUNCHERS? US REP ASKED WHETHER KHESTOV MEANT THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. KHESTOV SAID YES. US REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD EARLIER PROPOSED THAT NATIONAL MEANS SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY FURTHER AGREED MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE SUGGESTIONS ON THIS TOPIC TO MAKE AT A LATER TIME.

28. KHESTOV SAID THE WEST HAD ADVANCED A NEW IDEA OF A COMBINED COLLECTIVE CEILING OF 900,000 IN GENERAL AND A CEILING OF 700,000 FOR GROUND FORCES. DID THIS MEAN THAT, IN CASE THE WEST DID NOT REACH THE WHOLE FIGURE OF 700,000 IN GROUND FORCES AND HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY 650,000 GROUND FORCES, THEN IT COULD INCREASE ITS AIR FORCES TO 250,000? US REP SAID THIS WAS A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. KHESTOV SAID THAT, WHEN SOVIET REPS HAD LISTENED TO US REP'S EARLIER REMARKS, THEY HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT, APART FROM THE THREE TYPES OF WITHDRAWN US ARMAMENTS, F-4 AIRCRAFT, PERSHING LAUNCHERS AND WARHEADS, THE REMAINING ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION COULD BE INCREASED. THUS, IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE WEST COULD INCREASE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS,

WHILE THENUMBER OF AIRCRAFT, NOT BEING LIMITED, COULD ALSO
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BE INCREASED. US REP SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT
THE US DID NOT HAVE IN THE REDUCTION AREA ANY NUCLEAR-
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT EXCEPT THE F-4.

29. KHESTOV ASKED WHAT ABOUT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES AND THEIR AIRCRAFT HOLDINGS? US REP SAID THIS WAS
PERHAPS THE RIGHT MOMENT TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE REASONS AS TO
WHY THE WEST CONSIDERED THAT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US WESTERN
ARMAMENTS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THE WEST WAS UNWILLING
FOR THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE
ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS BECAUSE THIS WOULD PLACE THESE
COUNTRIES AT TOO GREAT A DISADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS THE USSR,
WHOSE ARMAMENTS, LOCATED ON TERRITORY WHICH WAS ADJACENT
TO THE AREA, WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT
WAS RELEVANT THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES INSIDE THE
USSR HAD IN RECENT YEARS BEEN INCREASING, PARTICULARLY
IN THE NUMBER OF MAJOR ARMAMENTS, AS WELL AS IN QUALITY OF
THOSE ARMAMENTS. THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT
COLLECTIVE LIMITS ON WESTERN MANPOWER IN RETURN FOR EASTERN
AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING OR CEILINGS THE WEST HAD
PROPOSED, BUT THIS WAS AS FAR AS THE WEST COULD GO.

30. KHESTOV SAID THAT US REP HAD DISPLAYED GREAT ABILITY
TO EVADE ANSWERING QUESTIONS. THIS WAS SHOWN BY THE FACT
THAT HE HAD NOT ANSWERED ANY OF THE FIVE MAJOR QUESTIONS
KHESTOV HAD PUT TO US REP. BUT NOTHING COULD BE DONE ABOUT
THIS. US REP SAID HE DISAGREED. HE HAD GIVEN STRAIGHTFORWARD
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS WHERE HE COULD, AND THE WEST WOULD BE
PREPARED WITH FURTHER ANSWERS AFTER THE SOVIETS HAD
MADE A RESPONSE ON THE REDUCTION CONTENT OF THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL.

31. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW SHORT GENERAL
COMMENTS ON THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL. THESE COMMENTS
WERE PERSONAL, AS WERE HIS OTHER COMMENTS DURING THE PRESENT
SESSION. KHESTOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS, BOTH
SIDES WERE SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS.

32. US REP SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD SOVIET REP IN THEIR
TALK ON DECEMBER 15, THE UNDERLYING U.S. AIM IN THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT AND THE
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ASSOCIATED RISK OF ESCALATION IN EUROPE. THAT WAS ALSO THE BACKGROUND OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF US EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IN THIS CASE, BY STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 096278

P 190600Z DEC 75
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1370
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

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33. WHATEVER THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE THOUGHT OF THE PAST WESTERN PROPOSAL, IN US REP'S VIEW, WHEN THE WHOLE NEW WESTERN PACKAGE WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, WEST WAS NOW OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS THE WEST WAS ASKING FROM EAST. THIS SHOULD MEAN THAT, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE SOVIETS' OWN EVALUATION, ACCEPTANCE OF THE AUGMENTED WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD LEAVE UNCHANGED THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MAIN POINTS SOVIET REPS HAD RAISED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EAST WOULD BE REDUCING MORE GROUND FORCES, BUT THE US WOULD BE REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN ADDITION TO ITS SOLDIERS.

34. US REP SAID HE CONSIDERED THAT, INSTEAD OF REDUCING ALL ARMAMENTS, A REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHOULD FOCUS ON ARMAMENTS OF MAJOR CONCERN. THIS WAS RELATED TO HIS OPENING POINT THAT THE BASIC US AIM WAS TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF CONFLICT AND ESCALATION. SO THE WEST THOUGHT THE FOCUS OF ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ON US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND SOVIET TANKS. THIS WAS RATIONAL, AND IT WAS ALL THAT WAS
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FEASIBLE. HE CONSIDERED THE TOTAL PACKAGE ON EACH SIDE EQUAL IN VALUE. HOWEVER, THESE PACKAGES DID NOT HAVE TO BE IDENTICAL IN COMPOSITION. IT WOULD BE MORE LOGICAL FOR EACH SIDE TO TRADE THE FORCES IT IS STRONGEST IN. THIS WAS WHAT THE WEST CALLED A "MIXED PACKAGE."

35. KHESTOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THESE REMARKS CLEARLY THOUGH HE WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT US REP SHOULD HAVE PERCEIVED FROM KHESTOV'S COMMENTS EARLIER ON THIS OCCASION WHAT SOVIET FEELINGS WERE ON THE US OFFER. ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, US REP HAD MADE THE POINT, AS HE HAD IN AT LEAST TEN PLACES IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT, THAT THIS NEW PROPOSAL WAS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ALL POINTS OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS AND THAT THE TWO FORMED AN INTEGRAL WHOLE. THAT IS, THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO IMPLEMENT THIS NEW PROPOSAL ONLY IF THE WESTERN OUTLINE WERE ACCEPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. BUT THE US REP WAS FULLY AWARE OF SOVIET CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. HENCE, HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GUESS SOVIET FEELINGS. KHESTOV COULD NOT NOW DWELL ON THE FEELINGS OR EVALUATIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE ON THE LATEST WESTERN OFFER OR CONSIDERATIONS. BUT US REP SHOULD BE ABLE TO GUESS THIS.

36. KHESTOV SAID THAT, HOWEVER, IN HIS DEC. 18. PLENARY STATEMENT, HE WOULD SUM UP THE RESULTS OF THE PRESENT ROUND, EXPLAIN THE EASTERN VIEWPOINT AND DISCUSS WHAT THE WEST HAD NOW PROPOSED. HE WOULD CRITICIZE SOME ASPECTS OF THIS PROPOSAL. BUT THE SOVIET DELEGATION ALSO WANTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD BE CONSIDERED. THE DELEGATION DID NOT WISH TO STATE THAT IT WOULD BE REJECTED FROM THE OUTSET. THIS WAS THE VIEW AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. BUT THERE WAS STILL TIME BEFORE THE PLENARY SESSION ON DEC. 18 TO RECEIVE CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS.

37. US REP SAID THAT, WHEN KHESTOV SPOKE OF A REACTION WHICH US REP COULD GUESS, HE ASSUMED KHESTOV MEANT THE POINT KHESTOV HAD MUST MADE, THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD REVIEW THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND CAREFULLY CONSIDER IT. US REP SAID HE BELIEVED SUCH A REACTION WOULD BE

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EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND, AFTER THE NEW ROUND BEGAN, HE HOPED KHLESTOV WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, SO THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS COULD FINALLY BEGIN. IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAKE THIS OFFER ONLY AFTER LONG CONSULTATION. HE THOUGHT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CLIMATE OF WESTERN OPINION WITH REGARD TO DETENTE HAD BECOME LESS FAVORABLE FOR THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND COULD BECOME LESS SO. HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY NOW TO GET THE TALKS MOVING.

38. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THIS POINT OF US REPS STATEMENT. HE HAD A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW ON THIS TOPIC. AS TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, HE HAD DESCRIBED THE POSITION HE WOULD TAKE IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT. HE HOPED TO HAVE CONFIRMATION ON THIS POINT FROM MOSCOW. BUT HE ALSO HOPED THAT AFTER THIS DISCUSSION, US REP DID NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD THE SAME ROSEY VIEW OF THE WESTERN OFFER AS THE US REP. THE SOVIET EVALUATION WAS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT. IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT US REPS UNDERSTAND THIS SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIETS SHARED THE OPTIMISM OF THEIR EVALUATION.

39. US REP SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE ONE FURTHER POINT: WHEN SOVIET REPS RETURNED TO VIENNA IN JANUARY, IN ADDITION TO SOVIET REACTION TO THE CONTENT OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL, US REPS EXPECTED THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOW FIND IT POSSIBLE TO ENTER INTO A DATA DISCUSSION. IN ITS NEW PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAD NOW PROVIDED THE EAST WITH FORTHCOMING ANSWERS ON ISSUES OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AND THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS. THESE WERE ISSUES WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED AS PRECONDITIONS TO A DISCUSSION OF DATA.

40. KHLESTOV SAID, IN THE COURSE OF THE SEVENTH ROUND, PARTICIPANTS HAD FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FORCE DEFINITION. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE US REP HAD BROUGHT UP ANY NEW ASPECTS WHICH WOULD GIVE SOVIETS GROUNDS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON DISCUSSION OF DATA. US REPS KNEW THE REASONS FOR THIS POSITION. HE HAD SEEN NO NEW ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THE EASTERN POSITION.

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41. THE DISCUSSION WAS THEN CONCLUDED.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 096319

P 190600Z DEC 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1371

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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EXDIS

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FROM US REP MBFR

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42. ON REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION WITH KHLESTOV REPORTED ABOVE, US REPS CONCLUDED THAT KHLESTOV'S UNDERSTANDING OF US REP'S NECESSARILY RESTRAINED ANSWER TO THE QUESTION KHLESTOV RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 25 MIGHT WELL BE THAT THE US WAS GOING TO LIMIT ONLY THE NUMBER OF PERSHING LAUNCHERS AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITHIN THE DELEGATION, US REP CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT TO LEAVE THE SOVIETS WITH THIS IMPRESSION NOW THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED THE FULL NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE WESTERN POSITION OPPOSING ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT, IN ORDER THAT THE OPTION 3 PROPOSAL RECEIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN MOSCOW, TO RESTORE THE BALANCE BY USING THE POINT CONTAINED IN THE FIRST TIC OF PARA 7 OF THE NAC GUIDANCE. ACCORDINGLY, US REP INFORMED SMIRNOVSKY ON THE MARGINS OF THE DECEMBER 18 PLENARY THAT, WITH

REGARD TO KHLESTOV'S QUESTION OF DECEMBER 17 ON LIMITATIONS
ON WITHDRAWN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE US WAS NOT PROPOSING
TO FORMULATE LIMITATIONS SOLELY IN TERMS OF DESIGNATING
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THE SPECIFIC MODELS WITHDRAWN, THE F-RJS AND PERSHING, AS KHLESTOV HAD INDICATED WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE US REP'S REPLY. INSTEAD, THE US WOULD PLAN TO FORMULATE LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES OF OVER 500 KILOMETER RANGE, AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS OF US AIRCRAFT. THIS WOULD BE A LIMITATION IN TERMS OF CLASS OF US DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS.

43. COMMENT: KHLESTOV'S REACTION DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE WAS MUCH AS WE HAD ANTICIPATED. THE GENERAL LINE OF KHLESTOV'S QUESTIONS ABOVE AS WELL AS THOSE HE ASKED ON DECEMBER 15 (MBFR VIENNA 0620 - EXDIS) MAKE CLEAR THAT THE INSISTENCE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AD HOC GROUP MEMBERS ON INCLUDING IN THE PRESENTATION OF OPTION 3 THE POINT THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS WERE NOT PART OF THE OFFER AND THAT LIMITATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE DID HAVE THE ANTICIPATED EFFECT OF FOCUSING SOVIET INTEREST ON ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS FROM THE OUTSET OF DISCUSSION OF OPTION 3. HOWEVER, KHLESTOV'S REMARKS DO PROVIDE SOME USEFUL INDICATION OF THE PROBABLE EASTERN LINE OF APPROACH WHEN THE VIENNA TALKS RESUME IN THE LAST WEEK OF JANUARY.

END COMMENT.RESOR

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